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Environmental Effects of Codecision Under 
the Maastricht Treaty 
INTRODUCTION 
Article 130 of the Single European Act1 requires that environmental 
protection be a component of the European Union's2 other policies.3 
The European Union Council of Ministers, which has traditionally had 
the final say in European Union (EU) legislation, has, however, often 
had minimal environmental goals.4 The introduction of the new code-
cision procedures in the Maastricht TreatyS has created an opportunity 
for the more pro-environmental European Parliament (EP) to have 
more input in the legislative process.6 By using these expanded powers, 
the EP can have a tremendous effect on the environmental impact of 
major EU legislation. 7 
Part I of this Note presents the major EU institutions involved in 
legislative processes. Part II discusses the legislative procedures in use 
prior to the enactment of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Part III 
examines the Directive on Municipal Waste-Water Treatment which 
I TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (EEC TREATY), in ENCYCLo-
PEDIA OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw (1993) at B10005, amended by the Single European Act, 
25 I.L.M. 503 (1986). The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community was signed 
in Rome on March 25, 1957 and entered into force on january 1, 1958. SeeT.C. HARTLEY, THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 3 (1981) (hereinafter HARTLEY 1981). 
The Single European Act was signed in 1986 and came into force July 1, 1987. See T.C. HARTLEY, 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 5 (1988). 
2 Under the Maasuicht Treaty, the Member States of the European Community established 
among themselves a European Union. Maastricht Treaty, infra note 5, art. A. For consistency, 
both the European Community and the European Union will be referred to as the Union in this 
Note. 
'EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 130r(2). 
4 See Balancing Differing Positions on Environment in Parliament, Council Seen as Big Challenge, 
[Current Developments] lnt'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 537 (June 26, 1996). 
5 The Treaty on European Union was signed in Maasuicht, the Netherlands, on February 7, 
1992 and came into force on November 1, 1993. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
31 I.L.M. 247 (1992) (hereinafter Maasuicht Treaty); see T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw 7 (1994) (hereinafter HARTLEY 1994). 
6 See Dieter Kugelmann, The Maastricht Treaty and the Design of a European Federal State, 8 
'ThMP. INT'L & CoMP. LJ. 335, 347 (1994). 
7 See infra notes 87-119 and accompanying text. 
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was promulgated prior to the enactment of the Maastricht Treaty. Part 
IV focuses on the new codecision procedure created by the Maastricht 
Treaty, with special emphasis on the role of the EP in the procedure. 
Part V examines the impact of the codecision procedure on the envi-
ronmental protections found in the Trans-European Network guide-
lines and on the landfill management directive (which technically does 
not fall under the codecision procedure). Part VI analyzes the impact 
of the codecision process. Finally, this Note concludes that the EP now 
has the ability to have a major impact on important EU legislation and 
its effects in the EU. 
I. LAWMAKING BoDIES oF THE EuROPEAN UNION 
EU legislation includes five types of acts: regulations, directives, 
decisions, recommendations, and opinions.8 Three institutional bodies 
are involved in the formation of this legislation.9 These institutions are 
the European Commission, the Council ofMinisters, and the EP. 10 The 
members of the European Commission are appointed by the Member 
States but are required to be above national loyalties.U One of the 
Commission's most important activities is the formulation of proposals 
for new EU legislation.12 
The Council of Ministers consists of representatives from the Mem-
ber States. 13 When general matters are discussed, the foreign ministers 
of each state are involved, but when specialized matters are discussed, 
other ministers are involved, such as the Ministers of Agriculture for 
agricultural matters or the Finance Ministers for financial issues.14 The 
Council makes the final decision on most EU legislation.15 
The EP is intended to represent the individual citizens of the EU. 16 
Members of the EP were originally selected by national legislatures but 
now are chosen through direct elections in the Member States, with 
each country allowed to create its own electoral proceduresP The role 
s See HARTLEY 1994, supra note 5, at 107. 
9 See Sari K.M. Laitinen-Rawana, Creating a Unified Europe: Maastricht and Beyund, 28 INT'L 
LAW. 973, 977 (1994). 
10 See id. 
11 See HARTLEY 1994, supra note 5, at 12. 
12 See id. at 11. 
uSee Heinrich Kirschner, Symposium un U.S.-E. C. Legal Relations: The Framework of the Euro-
pean Uniun Under the Treaty of Maastricht, 13J.L. & CoM. 233, 236-37 (1994). 
14 See id. at 237. 
15 See HARTLEY 1994, supra note 5, at 17. 
16 See id. at 27. 
17 See id. at 27-29. 
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of the EP in legislating has been quite limited but was expanded with 
the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty. 18 
Thus, the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, and the 
EP are involved in the formation of legislation, including regulations, 
directives, decisions, recommendations, and opinions, in the EU. 19 The 
Commission generally proposes all legislation, while the Council of 
Ministers makes the final decision on most legislation. 20 The role of 
the EP in legislating has traditionally been quite limited, but its role 
has expanded with the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty.21 
II. LAWMAKING PROCEDURES BEFORE MAASTRICHT 
Prior EU treaties established the procedures for enacting EU legis-
lation, including the input that the EP would have in the process.22 The 
EEC Treaty continued the consultation procedure instituted previously 
with the ECSC Treaty.23 This consultation procedure, still in use today 
for many issues, provides that legislation will be initiated solely by the 
European Commission, which then sends its proposed legislation to 
the EP for "consultation. "24 During the consultation procedure, the EP 
formulates an "opinion" which the Council can choose to ignore.25 
Mter the consultation, the Council of Ministers adopts a "common 
position" and has the final decision.26 The suggestions of the EP may, 
however, influence the Commission, which can amend the proposed 
legislation by unanimous vote at any time before the final vote by the 
Council.27 
The Single European Act (SEA) introduced the procedures of co-
operation and assent which have increased the involvement of the EP 
in the legislative process but fail to give the EPa true participatory role 
18 See CLIVE H. CHURCH & DAVID PHINNEMORE, EUROPEAN UNION AND EUROPEAN CoMMUNITY: 
A HANDBOOK AND CoMMENTARY ON THE POST-MAASTRICHT TREATIES, 257 (1994). 
19 See Laitinen-Rawana, supra note 9, at 977; HARTLEY 1994, supra note 5, at 107. 
2° See HARTLEY 1994, supra note 5, at 11, 17. 
21 See CHURCH & PHINNEMORE, supra note 18, at 257. 
22 See HARTLEY 1981, supra note 1, at 19-20. 
2~ See Pierre Mathijsen, The Power of Co-Decision of the European Parliament Introduced by the 
Maastricht Treaty, 8 ThL. EuR. & Crv. L.F. 81,82-83 (1993); 'TREATY EsTABLISHING THE EuROPEAN 
COAL AND STEEL CoMMUNITY, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN CoMMUNITY LAw, supra note 1, 
at B2003. The European Coal and Steel Community is a predecessor of the European Union, 
and was signed on April18, 1951 and entered into force on July 25, 1952. HARTLEY 1981, supra 
note 1, at 3. 
24 See Mathijsen, supra note 23, at 82. 
25 See id. at 83. 
26 See id. at 85. 
27 See id. at 83. 
250 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXI, No. 1 
in the formation of the legislation. 28 The co-operation procedure gives 
the EP a second consultation and the ability to reject the Council's 
final position.29 The Council can, however, override the parliamentary 
veto with a unanimous vote to enact the legislation.30 The co-operation 
procedure is used on certain issues, including competition, transport 
and the environmentY The assent procedure is utilized primarily for 
decisions on the accession to the EU of new Member States and on 
bilateral or multilateral agreements outside the EU.32 A majority of the 
EP must agree before the accession or agreement will be concluded.33 
The assent procedure effectively gives the EP veto power over these 
issues.34 
Thus, before the enactment of the Maastricht Treaty, the EP could 
be involved in the legislation procedure via consultation, co-operation, 
or assent.35 With consultation, the EP must be allowed to give its 
opinion, but this opinion can be ignored by the Council. 36 With co-op-
eration, the EP has an additional opportunity to give its opinion, as 
well as the ability to reject the Council's final opinion.37 The Council 
may, however, override this parliamentary veto with a unanimous 
vote.38 With assent, the EP ha~ an effective veto in very limited areas.39 
None of these procedures allows the EP actually to formulate and 
control the legislation.40 
III. PRE-MAASTRICHT LEGISLATION: DIRECTIVE ON MUNICIPAL 
WASTE-WATER TREATMENT 
The Directive on Municipal Waste-Water Treatment was promul-
gated prior to the enactment of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992,41 This 
28 See id. at 83-84. 
29 See Mathijsen, supra note 23, at 83-84. 
30 See id. 
31 See Michael H. Abbey & Nicholas Bromfield, A Practitioner's Guide to the Maastricht Treaty, 
15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1329, 1351 (1994). 
32 See DAVID O'KEEFFE & PATRICK M. TwOMEY, LEGAL IssuES OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY 196 
(1994). 
33 See id. 
34 See Mathijsen, supra note 23, at 84. 
35 See id. at 82-84. 
36 See id. at 83. 
37 See id. at 83-84. 
38 See id. 
39 See O'KEEFFE & TwoMEY, supra note 32, at 196; Mathijsen, supra note 23, at 84. 
40 See Mathijsen, supra note 23, at 83-84. 
41 See 1991 OJ. (L 135) 40, tit. 
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directive attempts to harmonize the regulations governing municipal 
waste-water treatment among the Member States and deals directly 
with the prevention of environmental problems caused by sewage.42 
The directive was promulgated using the consultation procedure for 
the EP.43 Due to the limited nature of the legislative procedures, the 
EP was only able to give an "opinion. "44 
In this "opinion," the EP suggested a number of changes to the 
directive.45 The EP proposed adding wording on the control of fertiliz-
ers,46 nitrogen, and phosphorus;47 expanding treatment of waste-water 
discharged into "less sensitive" areas;48 and including treatment of 
bacterial pollution.49 The EP also suggested increasing the number of 
treatment plants affected (by including smaller plants within the scope 
of the directive);50 introducing required, regular ecosystem monitor-
ing;51 and lowering the maximum allowable pollutant concentrations. 52 
In addition, the EP proposal included increasing the protection of 
"sensitive" areas;53 and changing the wording in several clauses from 
"should" to "must" in order to require, rather than merely suggest, 
compliance. 54 
The Council was able to enact the legislation regardless of this 
extensive "opinion."55 Out of more than 50 proposed amendments, the 
Council made only one significant change.56 The significant change 
was in requiring one contaminant to be reduced by at least 50% during 
waste-water treatment. 57 The original proposal required no reduction, 
while the EP proposal required an 80% reduction. 58 The Directive was 
indeed enacted as a Council Directive only, as opposed to a Council 
42 See 1991 OJ. (L 135) 40-41, pmbl., art. I. 
43 See 1991 OJ. (L 135) 40-52 app., available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Eclaw File. 
44 See Mathijsen, supra note 23, at 83. 
45 See 1990 OJ. (C 260) 185-97. 
46 See id. at 185. 
47 See id. at 189. 
48 See id. at 188. 
49 See id. 
5° See 1990 OJ. (C 260) 189-90. 
5I See id. at 191. 
52 See id. at 193-94. 
53 See id. at 189-90, 195. 
54 See id. at 186. 
55 See Mathijsen, supra note 23, at 83. 
ss Compare 1990 OJ. (C 260) 193 with 1991 OJ. (L 135) 41. 
57 Compare 1990 OJ. (C 260) 193 with 1991 OJ. (L 135) 41. 
58 See 1990 OJ. (C 260) 193. 
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and EP Directive, as would be available under the new codecision 
procedure.59 If the EP had been able to utilize the codecision proce-
dure, it is almost certain that the directive would have been more 
environmentally stringent.60 
Thus, the EP recommended that the proposed directive on munici-
pal waste-water, promulgated pre-Maastricht, be changed to include 
more strict environmental requirements.61 The Council, however, en-
acted the legislation without including these changes.62 The lack of 
power granted to the EP under the pre-Maastricht procedures made 
this result possible.63 If the EP had been able to utilize the codecision 
procedure, it is likely that the directive would have provided greater 
protection of the environment. 54 
IV. LAWMAKING AFTER MAASTRICHT 
The Maastricht Treaty expanded the powers of the EP by estab-
lishing the new codecision procedure.65 The Treaty text, however, does 
not actually mention this expression but instead refers to the "proce-
dure provided for in Article 189(b)" of the Maastricht Treaty, which 
details this procedure.66 This power is nevertheless referred to gener-
ally as the codecision procedure. 67 This procedure is similar to the 
co-operation procedure described above in that it gives the EP a second 
consultation and the ability to reject the Council's final position.68 With 
the codecision procedure, however, the Council cannot override the 
parliamentary veto with a unanimous vote to enact the legislation.69 
Instead, the EP may effectively block the enactment of legislation.70 
59 See 1996 OJ. (L 228) 1, tit.; 1991 OJ. (L 135) 40, tit.; infra notes 65-86 and accompanying 
text. 
60 See 1990 OJ. (C 260) 185-97. 
61 See supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text; see generally 1990 OJ. (C 260) 185-97. 
62 See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text; see generally 1991 OJ. (L 135) 40-52. 
65 See generally 1990 OJ. (C 260) 185-97. 
64 See id. 
65 See CHURCH & PHINNEMORE, supra note 18, at 257. 
66 See Mathijsen, supra note 23, at 81. A revision of the treaties governing the European 
Community is being considered which would simplify the codecision procedure. See 1997 OJ. (C 
33) 1, art. 39. 
67 See Mathijsen, supra note 23, at 81-82. 
68 See id. at 8~5. 
69 See id. at 86. 
70 See CHURCH & PHINNEMORE, supra note 18, at 299. If the Parliament has rejected the common 
position of the Council, the Council has the option of proceeding to the conciliation procedure 
or dropping the legislation. See id. at 299. 
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The EP may also propose legislative amendments. 71 If the parliamen-
tary amendments are opposed by the Council or the Commission, the 
conciliation procedure, a special sub-procedure within the codecision 
process, is utilized in an attempt to resolve the differences. 72 
The conciliation procedure begins with the creation of the Concili-
ation Committee.73 The Committee is convened by the President of the 
Council in agreement with the President of the EP.74 The Committee 
consists of the members of the Council and an equal number of 
representatives of the EP.75 The Committee attempts to produce ajoint 
text which is then presented to both the EP and the Council of Min-
isters.76 The joint text is a compromise version of the proposed legisla-
tion developed by the Committee members in negotiations over six 
weeks.77 If both institutions approve the joint text, it becomes promul-
gated as law.78 The legislation is then identified as a product of both 
the Council and the EP, as opposed to the practice under pre-Maas-
tricht legislative procedures of designating legislation as emanating 
from the Council only. 79 In the absence of a joint text, the Council may 
again present its original version to the EP, which again has the ability 
to accept or reject it, with no possibility of override by the Council.80 
The codecision procedure applies only to legislation in certain topic 
areas, including environmental action programs, the Trans-European 
network (TEN), research frameworks, internal market legislation, the 
right of establishment and free circulation of workers, education, 
health, and consumer protection. 81 
Thus, in certain limited subject areas, the Maastricht Treaty has 
expanded the powers of the EP by establishing the new codecision 
procedure.82 The Council can no longer override a parliamentary veto 
71 See Mathijsen, supra note 23, at 86. 
72 See CHURCH & PHINNEMORE, supra note 18, at 299. 
75 See Mathijsen, supra note 23, at 86. 
74 See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 5, art. 189(b), at 1 3. 
75 See id., at 'I 4. 
76 See id., at 'l'f 4, 5. 
77 See O'KEEFFE & TwoMEY, supra note 32, at 195. 
78 See Abbey & Bromfield, supra note 31, at 1351. 
79 See Mathijsen, supra note 23, at 86; compare 1996 OJ. (L 228) 1, tit., with 1991 OJ. (L 135) 
40 tit. 
80 See Mathijsen, supra note 23, at 86. 
81 See Abbey & Bromfield, supra note 31, at 1331; CHURCH & PHINNEMORE, supra note 18, at 
300. A revision of the treaties governing the European Community is being considered which 
would expand the use of the codecision procedure to other areas. See 1997 OJ. (C 33) 1, art. 11, 
31, 38. 
82 See CHURCH & PHINNEMORE, supra note 18, at 257. 
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where the EP has rejected the Council's position, as was possible under 
the pre-Maastricht procedures.83 Instead, the EP may effectively block 
the enactment of legislation,84 propose legislative amendments,85 or 
help to create a more acceptable version of the legislation in the 
conciliation procedure.86 
V. PosT-MAASTRICHT LEGISLATION 
With these new legislative powers, the EP has been able to affect the 
final form of regulations which impact the environment.87 Part A of 
this section examines the impact that the EP has been able to have on 
the environmental protections included in major transportation legis-
lation due to the new codecision procedure. Part B shows that this 
expansion of power has led to a new respect for the EP, so that the EP 
is able to provide input into legislation even where this input is not 
technically required. 
A. Environmental Protection in the Trans-European Network Guidelines 
The TEN guidelines are a set of programs that will create large, 
interlocking transport, telecommunications, and energy proects 
throughout the EU.88 As originally proposed by the Commission an-
dadopted as a common position by the Council, the TEN legislation 
decision did not include specific provisions on the need for environ-
mental protection.89 However, the EP made use of the codecision 
procedure to force the inclusion of protections for the environment 
in the final TEN legislation decision.90 
The final guidelines dealing with the Trans-European Transport 
Network were promulgated using the complete codecision proce-
dure.91 Mter the EP suggested amendments which the Council re-
jected, the conciliation procedure was initiated and resulted in final 
83 See Mathijsen, supra note 23, at 85-86. 
84 See CHURCH & PHINNEMORE, supra note 18, at 299. 
85 See Mathijsen, supra note 23, at 86. 
86 See CHURCH & PHINNEMORE, supra note 18, at 299. 
87 See infra notes 87-119 and accompanying text. 
88 See 1996 OJ. (L 228) 1; 1996 OJ. (L 161) 1; 1996 OJ. (C 134) 4. 
89 See generally 1995 OJ. (C 331) 102-03. 
90 See Future Guidelines on Trans-Europe Network to Address Environmental Impact Assessment, 
[Current Developments] Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 540 (June 26, 1996) [hereinafter Future Guide-
lines]. 
91 See 1996 OJ. (L 228) 1 app., available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Eclaw File. 
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guidelines which were promulgated as a joint decision of the Council 
and the EP.92 The procedure took more than two months to complete.93 
During this time, the parliamentary members refused to lessen their 
demands and were ultimately successful in including specific environ-
mental protections in the final decision.94 The guidelines were publish-
ed as a joint act of the Council and the EP, unlike the previously 
discussed Municipal Waste-Water Treatment Directive which was pub-
lished as a Council directive only.95 
In response to suggestions by the EP, the Council's first amendment, 
made before the initiation of the codecision procedure, gave several 
concessions in the environmental arena.96 First, the amended version 
added references to environmental protection, both in the preamble 
(not legally binding) and in the enacting terms.97 Second, the amend-
ed proposal contained a rewritten Article 7 which provides that envi-
ronmental aspects will be taken into account at every stage of network 
development.98 The Council refused, however, to incorporate a sepa-
rate article in its amended version dealing specifically with the need 
for environmental protection, contending that this was unnecessary 
given the concessions mentioned above.99 
The EP, however, was not satisfied with the concessions made by the 
Council in its amended version.100 By forcing the issue during the 
conciliation procedure, the EP succeeded in having a separate article 
dealing specifically with the need for environmental protection in-
serted into the decision, thereby expanding the effects of environ-
mental impact assessments previously mentioned only in the pream-
ble.101 Article 8 on environmental protection specifies that Member 
States must execute environmental impact assessments of TEN's pro-
jects and also that the Commission will develop methods for evaluating 
the environmental impact of the entire network.102 By moving the 
requirement for environmental impact assessment into the body of the 
92 See id.; 1996 OJ. (L 228) 1, tit. 
93 See Future Guidelines, supra note 90, at 540. 
94 See id. 
95 Compare 1996 OJ. (L 228) 1, tit., with 1991 OJ. (L 135) 40, tit. 
96 See 1995 OJ. (C 331) 102-Q3. 
97 See 1995 OJ. (C 331) 102-Q3. Provisions concerning the environment were added in the 
preamble and Article 2, 2a, and 5h. See id. 
98 See 1995 OJ. (C 331) 102. 
99 See id. 
IOO See Future Guidelines, supra note 90, at 540. 
101 See id.; 1996 OJ. (L 228) 1, pmbl., art. 8. 
102 See 1996 OJ. (L 228) 1, art. 8. 
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document, the EP has succeeded in ensuring that the Member States 
will be required to perform environmental impact assessments on 
TEN's projects.103 In addition, the preamble now contains a clause that 
suggests that the environmental impact assessment should not only be 
performed, but be the basis for deciding whether or not to continue 
with the project.104 
B. Landfill Directive 
Furthermore, the EP has succeeded in using its newly acquired 
power to change a directive that it has no actual technical power to 
change.105 The directive on the landfill of waste is being promulgated 
under the co-operation procedure of the EU.106 The directive covers 
landfilling of hazardous and non-hazardous waste but would not apply 
to landfills of up to 50,000 tons final capacity.107 The Council has 
adopted a common position on the legislation108 and has consulted 
with the EP as required.109 In the face of overwhelming opposition by 
the EP, the European Commission has decided to withdraw its pro-
posal, even though it technically could ignore the parliamentary opin-
ion.ll0 The EP has objected that, because landfills up to 50,000 tons 
capacity may not be regulated, the number of landfills that would be 
covered by the directive is minimal-as many as 70% of the landfills 
in the EU may not be covered by the directivell1-thus making the 
directive ineffective in providing environmental protection. The Com-
mission will draft new legislation that will expand the number of 
landfills covered by the directive, even though it is not technically 
required to do so by the co-operation procedure.112 The Commission's 
actions are being taken out of respect for the EP.113 The actions by the 
Commission could indicate a new tendency to include the EP in the 
1M See 1995 OJ. (C 331) 102-03. 
104 See 1996 OJ. (L 228) 1, prnbl.(9). 
105 See Commission to Withdraw LandftU Proposal in Light of European Parliament Opposition, 
[Current Developments] Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 590 (July 10, 1996) [hereinafter Commission]. 
106 See 1992 OJ. (C 305) 50, tit. 
107 See 1996 OJ. (C 59) 1, art. 3. 
JOB See 1996 OJ. (C 59) 1, tit. 
109 See Commission, supra note 105, at 589. 
110 See id. at 590. 
111 See 1996 OJ. (C 59) 1, art. 3; Commission, supra note 105, at 589. 
112 See Commission, supra note 105, at 589. 
113 See id. 
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legislative process, even where that is not technically required under 
the treaties.U4 
Thus, in both the TEN's guidelines and the landfill directive, the EP 
was able to use its powers under the codecision procedure to obtain 
greater environmental protections. 115 First, the TEN guidelines now 
include a separate article dealing with the need for environmental 
protection.116 This article was originally opposed by the Council but 
supported by the EP.117 Second, all TEN projects must include an 
environmental impact assessment which may be a criteria for deciding 
the fate of the project.U8 Finally, the landfill directive that will be 
proposed by the Commission will regulate more of the Community 
landfills than originally proposed by the Commission. 119 
VI. ANALYSIS: THE IMPACT OF CODECISION 
Under the codecision procedure of the Maastricht Treaty, the EP 
now has sufficient power to affect the substantive content of Commu-
nity legislation.12° Comparing the legislative outcomes of municipal 
waste-water treatment with those of the TEN and landfill management, 
it is apparent both that the EP has more power and that it has used 
that power to increase the level of environmental protection provided 
by EU legislation.121 The codecision procedure has also produced a 
new respect for the EP on the part of the Council. 122 In the TEN's 
guidelines procedure, the Council made concessions to the EP prior 
to the conciliation procedure itself,123 perhaps in the hopes of avoid-
ing the necessity of the conciliation procedure. In addition, after com-
pletion of the conciliation procedure the guidelines were much 
stronger environmentally than originally proposed.124 With the landfill 
management directive, the EP was able to have an impact on the 
regulations even though technically the codecision procedure would 
114 See id. at 589-90. 
115 See Future Guidelines, supra note 90, at 540; Commission, supra note 105, at 589. 
116 See 1996 OJ. (L 228) 1, art. 8. 
117 See 1995 OJ. (C 331) 102. 
118 See 1996 OJ. (L 228) 1, pmbl.(9). 
119 See Commission, supra note 105, at 589. 
12° See supra notes 87-119 and accompanying text. 
121 See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text; supra notes 87-119 and accompanying text. 
122 See Commission, supra note 105, at 590. 
123See1995 OJ. (C 331) 102-03. 
124 See Future Guidelines, supra note 90, at 540; 1996 OJ. (L 228) 1, pmbl., art. 8. 
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not be used.125 In comparison, the municipal waste-water treatment 
directive contained virtually none of the environmental protection 
suggestions proposed by the EP. l26 
With both the TEN guidelines and the landfill management direc-
tive, the substantive changes forced by the EP will have effects beyond 
environmental ones.127 The requirement for environmental impact as-
sessments for TEN projects means that the costs for the projects will 
increase and that the projects themselves could be stopped or at least 
delayed by the environmental impact assessment process.128 The land-
fill management directive suggested by the EP will cover more landfills 
than the Commission originally intended, thereby increasing the costs 
associated with operating these facilities.129 Thus, the EP, with the 
advent of the codecision procedure for certain issues under the Maas-
tricht Treaty, now has the ability to have a major impact on important 
EU legislation and its effects in the EU. 
CONCLUSION 
The European Commission, the Council of Ministers, and the EP 
are involved in the formation of legislation, including regulations, 
directives, decisions, recommendations, and opinions, in the Commu-
nity. The Commission generally proposes all legislation while the 
Council of Ministers makes the final decision on most legislation. The 
role of the EP in legislating has traditionally been quite limited, but its 
role has expanded with the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty. Before 
the enactment of the Maastricht Treaty, the EP could be involved in 
the legislation procedure via consultation, co-operation, or assent. In 
the directive on municipal waste-water, promulgated pre-Maastricht, 
the EP recommended that the proposal be changed to include more 
strict environmental requirements. The Council, however, was able to 
enact the legislation without including these changes due to the EP's 
lack of power under these pre-Maastricht procedures. The Maastricht 
Treaty has expanded the powers of the EP by establishing the new 
codecision procedure. The Council can no longer override a parlia-
mentary veto where the EP has rejected the Council's position, as was 
125 See Commission, supra note 105, at 589. 
126 See generally 1990 OJ. (C 260) 185-97. 
127 See Future Guidelines, supra note 90, at 540; 1996 OJ. (L 228) 1; Commission, supra note 
105, at 589. 
128 See Future Guidelines, supra note 90, at 540; 1996 OJ. (L 228) 1, pmbl. 
129 See Commission, supra note 105, at 589-90. 
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possible under the pre-Maastricht procedures. Instead, the EP may ef-
fectively block the enactment of legislation, propose legislative amend-
ments, or help to create a more acceptable version of the legislation 
in the conciliation procedure. 
In both the TEN's guidelines and the landfill directive, enacted 
post-Maastricht, the EP was able to use its new powers under the 
codecision procedure to obtain greater environmental protections. 
Comparing the outcomes observed in the instances of municipal waste-
water treatment with those of the TEN and landfill management, it is 
apparent both that the EP has more power and that they have used 
that power to increase the level of environmental protection provided 
by Community legislation. With both the TEN's guidelines and the 
landfill management directive, the substantive changes forced by the 
EP will have effects beyond the environmental ones. Thus, the EP, with 
the advent of the codecision procedure for certain issues under the 
Maastricht Treaty, now has the ability to have a major impact on 
important Community legislation and its effects in the Community. 
judith C.H. Sheldon 
